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M.: Wills--Class Gifts--Determination of Members of Class
RECENT CASE COMMENTS

Wnzz-Cr-Ass

GIFTS--DETERINATION OF MEBERs OF CrIAss.

-T's will read: "I bequeath to the children of my daughter...
[A] the one-half of my land, and the other half I give to ... [X].
I bequeath also to my widow her third of my land, her lifetime, to
include the mansion house." T died the following day, March 21,
1875. Twenty months later, within the widow's lifetime, P was
born to A. Held, that the class of A's children closes as of T's
death, thereby excluding P, the after-born child. Dawson v. Chi7istopher.1
The court viewed the devise to the widow -as a mere confirmation of her dower rights rather than an undivided life estate.2 It
is possible, however, that under the existing laws at the time of the
testator's death the devise did more than merely confirm these
claims. Although frequently, when no injustice was done to the
heirs, the widow was assigned the mansion house of the decedent,
yet, as a matter of right, the widow could not require its assignment to her, together with the part of the decedent's land in kind
to which she was entitled.' At common law, the widow's right to
the occupation of the mansion house embraced only the period of the
widow's quarantine. 4 It would thus seem that the widow did not
take simply a dower share, but rather a conventional life estate in
one-third of the testator's land including the mansion house.
In the determination of a class of testamentary beneficiaries,
courts have been influenced largely by two underlying principles
or policies: the desire to avoid inconvenience by as early a distribution as possible and the desire to let in as many children as
11 S. E. (2d) 175 (W. Va. 1940).
2 In so doing, the court gives effect to the doctrine of worthier title, that is,
where the same quantity and quality of estate is devised by a will that would
result to the devisee by operation of law, the law casts the title upon the devisee by descent. Gilpin v. Hollingsworth, 3 Md. 190, 56 Am. Dee. 737 (1852);
Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N. E. 314, Ann. Cas. 1912A 740 (1909);
Dehny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, 23 N. E. 519 (1890). Also see Jones v. Hudson,
12 S. E. (2d) 533 (W. Va. 1940), in which the court considered a testamentary
disposition dividing equally all of the testator's stock and realty as requiring
a distribution in conformity with the law of intestacy.

8De Vaughn v. De Vaughn, 19 Gratt. 556 (Va. 1870), cifed in the instant
case; Simmons v. Lyle, 32 Gratt. 752 (Va. 1880). But see Le Fevre v. Le Fevre,
109 W. Va. 260, 153 S.E. 918 (1930), citing the De Vaughn case simply for the
proposition that "unless injustice will thereby be done to the heirs, it is usual
to assign to the widow the home or residence of the deceased."
42 .BL.
Comm. 135 (1770) ; 4 KXEx'S Com. 61 (1896). W. VA. CODE 1870,
c. 65, § 8. This section, which was in force at the time of the testator 's death
in the instant case, is merely declaratory of the common law. Today, however,
the widow has the statutory right to occupy the mansion house until the youngest minor child becomes of age, if she be left with minor children by the testator
at his death. W. VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 43, art. 1, § 11.
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possibly consistent with the principle of convenience. 5 In giving
effect to the first principle it has been uniformly held that where
there is a devise "to the children of A" and no life estate intervenes, the class closes at the testator's death and after-born children are precluded from taking under the will. 6 When, on the
other hand, a life estate intervenes, that is, "to A for life and then
to the children of B", the class is held to increase at least until the
death of the life tenant.7 Nevertheless, in the instant case, the court
construed the devise to the widow only as a testamentary confirmation of her dower rights, and then held the class closes at the
testator's death. While the doctrine favoring the early vesting of
estates should normally control, it is obvious that no inconvenience
would result here (at least as to the mansion house) where the
devise was "to A for life, and after her death to the children of
B". "Here the remainder vests at once in the children living at
the death of the testator, but will open and let in all children of
B born after that time, but before the death of A." 8 In other
words, the remainder to the children living at the testator's death
might have been regarded as vested, subject to partial divestment
by the birth of more children after the testator's death. Presumably this possibility was not sufficiently apparent in the disposition
of the present litigation.
L. R. M.
WILnS--UMTuAL WILLS OF HUSBAND

AND WIFE-INT

T OF

SuRvivOR.-H and W executed wills, each leaving all of his or her
estate to the other. H had typed both wills, and the provisions were
practically identical. They were signed by H and W and witnessed
by the same witnesses, at the same time, all in the presence of each
other. W died, and H probated her will. Fifteen months later H
died, and his will, leaving his estate to W, was offered for probate
by the illegitimate daughter of W. There was ample evidence that
H informally indicated an intent that his will continue in effect.
Heirs-at-law of H contested the probate, which was denied. The
lower court held that the testamentary intent was to make the
survivor the sole beneficiary, and that on the death of one of the
parties, the remaining will became inoperative. Held, that mere
SIMEs, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 378.
6 KAES,FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS (1905) c. 10, § 226.
7 Id. at pp. 326-327; Hamletts v. Hamlett's Ex'r, 12 Leigh 350 (Va. 1841);
Cooper v. Hepburn, 15 Gratt. 551 (Va. 1860); Bently v. Ash, 59 W. Va. 641,
53 S. E. 636 (1906); Sleeper v. Killion, 182 Iowa 245, 164 N. W. 241 (1917).
8 Note (1899) 4 VA. L. REG. 624 (italics supplied).
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